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FINE ART: PROTECTION OF ARTIST AND ART*
"Above all, it is a matter of loving art, not of understanding it."
Fernand Leger
I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of fine art involves two primary interests: the eco-
nomic or property interests, preserved by copyright and resale roy-
alty laws and the artist's personality interests, supported by moral
rights doctrines. All are not available in the United States at the
present. This article will examine the types of protection available
in general for fine art and the presence or absence of each type in
the United States. In addition, existing safeguards in the United
States will be analyzed as to their effectiveness. This article will
also recommend improvement of existing safeguards through fur-
ther statutory revisions and an educational program.
In this article, "artist" is used to describe a person who creates
one-of-a-kind (unless otherwise indicated), visual works of art as
an aesthetic expression for enjoyment and communication. Primar-
ily, painters, sculptors and some graphic artists are such persons.
These fine artists are distinguished from applied artists whose
work is created for design, decoration or utilitarian use. This dis-
tinction draws a fine line between fine art and applied art and the
line is not always highly visible. However, since the interests of a
fine artist and an applied artist differ, this distinction is necessary.
Fine artists are concerned with the original, unique creation,
whereas, applied artists are interested in maximized reproduction
of each work.
The protection of fine art must also be contrasted with that of
literary and musical works. Although all of the works require crea-
tivity, protection of each are not the same. Literary and musical
works are created for mass reproduction, economic benefits in the
form of royalties being directly tied to the volume of sales. In con-
trast, the value of fine art is calculated not by quantity of copies
but by quality of the original unique work. In general, no royalty
scheme similar to that of musicians and literary authors is granted
to fine artists.
This Note was awarded First Prize, University of Miami School of Law, in the 1983
ASCAP Nathan Burkan Competition and was entered in the National ASCAP Competition.
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The value of the original work of fine art to its creator is in-
creased since any destruction or mutilation of the work destroys it
permanently. Music or literary works need not share in this risk
since such works are easily copied without decreasing their value.
These distinctions make necessary separate examination of the
protection of fine art.
II. PROTECTION OF FINE ART UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Copyrightability
Under section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act,' copyrightable
works are "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression. .. from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated."
To determine originality, the courts follow the two require-
ments set forth in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.:'
that "1) the particular work 'owe its origin' to the author" (i.e.
originality) and 2) the "'author' contributed something more than
a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own"' (i.e.
individual contribution).4 No tests for novelty, ingenuity or aes-
thetic value must be applied.5 In Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co.,6 the Supreme Court stated that "[ilt would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to con-
stitute themselves final judges of the worth of [art] . . . ," thus
mandating courts not to use their own aesthetic values in judging
the copyrightability of a work.
To a fine artist, originality is a deceptive issue. The same sub-
ject used in the original may be copied in another artistic process,
method or style, not within copyright protection,8 or, alternatively,
the same process, method or style may be copied, using a different
subject. Both types of copying are considered to be original. In
both instances, the copier has usually fulfilled the originality and
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (effective Jan. 1,
1978) (revising 1909 Copyright Act).
2. Copyright Revision Act, 17 U.S.C. 1102 (1976).
3. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
4. Id. at 102-103.
5. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Houss Rz-
PoarTI; S. Rap. No. 473, 94th Cong. 1st Seas. 47-49, at 50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sm
RzPORI.
6. 188 U.S. 239 (102).
7. Id. at 251.




University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 7
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/7
PROTECTION OF ARTIST AND ART
individual contribution requirements sufficiently enough to secure
a copyright, by not identically copying the original.'
Section 102's second requirement necessary for copyrightabili-
ty is that such original work be "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression."10 Fixation is defined in section 101 as authorized, per-
manent embodiment in a copy, which is able to be perceived, re-
produced or otherwise communicated." Traditional artists, such as
painters and sculptors have no problem meeting the fixation re-
quirement since their work is embodied in the canvas, paper, clay
or stone and has the ability to be perceived permanently."
Under section 101, copies are the material objects in which
copyrightable works are capable of being fixed." The House and
Senate Reports draw a distinction between "original work" which
is the "product of authorship" and "copies" which are the material
objects.14 Both must exist before the subject matter can be copy-
rightable.'8 Thus, a physical painting, sculpture, photograph or
drawing would not be deemed an original work of authorship but
only a copy embodying the original work. This technical distinc-
tion causes an artist both confusion and distress.
The category of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works defined
in section 101, includes two and three-dimensional works of fine
art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, among others."
Such works fall within this category based upon their form but not
on mechanical or utilitarian aspects. In a useful article, the design
will fall within the pictorial, graphic and sculptural works category
"only if, and only to the extent that such design incorporates pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article."'" Design incorporated in a useful
article or applied art, and separately identifiable, falls within the
9. See Oppenheimer, Originality in Art Reproductions: Variations in Search of a
Theme, COPYRIGHT L. Sya,. (ASCAP).
10. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
11. Id. §101.
12. See Millinger, Copyright and the Fine Artise, 48 Gzo. WAsH. L. Rev. 354, 359
(1980). Conceptual artists, such as Christo, whose work is temporary, do not meet the fixa-
tion requirement unless their work is embodied in film or photographs. Id.
13. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House
REPORT]; S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
15. Id.
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pictorial, graphic or sculptural works category regardless of mass
production, commercial exploitation and potential availability of
design patent availability, as declared by the Supreme Court in
Mazer v. Stein.1 Without this separate identity, however, no copy-
right protection will be given."'
B. Exclusive Rights and Their Limitations
Section 106 enumerates the copyright owner's exclusive rights
to do or to authorize.20 Limitations on these exclusive rights are
found in sections 107 through 118.hl A copyright owner of visual
art owns the exclusive rights of reproduction, 2 adaptation, publi-
cations and display." Of these, only the rights of reproduction and
adaptation remain with the artist, as copyright owner, after the in-
itial sale of the work. The buyer of a particular work of art may
freely display publicly the purchased copy" and dispose of posses-
sion without the authority of the copyright owner.
2 7
The copyright owner's right of reproduction of the work of art
is limited by several provisions of the 1976 Act. Under section 107,
the fair use of a copyrighted work for "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research" is not
an infringement.2 In section 108, libraries and archives may
reproduce no more than one copy if: a) the purpose is not commer-
18. 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
19. Copyright of applied art which meets the Mazer standards and which has been
offered for distribution to the public, does not include a right to prevent pictures or photo-
graphs of the art where used "in connection with advertisements or commentaries related to
the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news reports." The exclu-
sive right of reproduction of the underlying copyrighted pictorial graphic and sculptural
works remains with the owner of such work and includes the right "to reproduce in or on
any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise." 17 U.S.C. §113 (1976).
20. 17 U.S.C. 1106 (1976).
21. 17 US.C. §1107-18 (1976).
22. "Reproduction" is the right to duplicate in a material object a copyrighted work
exactly or by imitation or simulation. Housz REPORT, supra note 5, at 61; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 58.
23. "Adaptation" is the right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work. 17 U.S.C. §106(2) (1976).
24. Publication is "the distribution of copies... of a work to the public by sale.
17 U.S.C. §101 (1976).
25. Display is "to show a copy of [a work] either directly or by... device . 17
U.S.C. §101 (1976). The exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, and dis-
play are enumerated in 17 U.S.C. §106 (1976).
26. 17 U.S.C. §109(b) (1976). "Publicly" means " . . . to display that copy publicly,
either directly or by projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at
the place where the copy is located." Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (1976).
28. 17 U.S.C. §107 (1976).
[Vol. 1:99
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cial advantage, b) the public or all researchers in a specialized field
have access to the collections of the library or archives; and c) the
reproduction includes a notice of copyright.2 ' Section 113 allows a
copyrighted work, lawfully reproduced in useful articles offered
publicly to be photographed for advertisements or commentaries
on such useful articles.30 In section 118, the transmission by non-
commercial broadcasting stations of published pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works may be simultaneously reproduced by a gov-
ernmental body or non-profit organization."
A fine artist owning the copyright in a work of art has an ex-
clusive yet limited right of adaptation. New works are adjudged to
be copyrightable subject matter by the originality and individual
contribution requirements, allowing any work having more than a
merely trivial variation from another to satisfy the requirements.
Thus, the right of adaptation in the visual arts is not as strong as
first perceived. 2s
Sections 110, 113, and 118 limit the artist's right to display.
8
3
Section 110 exempts from copyright liability: displays in face-to-
face teaching activities, instructional broadcasting, religious ser-
vices and mere reception of broadcasts in a public place." Display
of pictures or photographs of work lawfully reproduced in utilita-
rian articles is allowable under section 113.' 5 Again, a display of
published pictorial graphic and sculptural works, may be transmit-
ted by noncommercial educational broadcast stations through a
compulsory license. 6 As previously mentioned, section 109(b) al-
lows a purchaser to publicly display the work in any gallery, mu-
seum or other public place without the copyright owner's
authority. 7
The right of publication is a vital concept as to unique works
of fine art, for many provisions of the 1976 Act hinge upon the
publication of the work of art.38 The existence of publication can
eventually invalidate an artist's copyright if the appropriate steps
29. 17 U.S.C. §108 (1976).
30. 17 U.S.C. §113 (1976).
31. 17 U.S.C. §118(d)(3) (1976).
32. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
33. 17 U.S.C. §§110, 113, 118 (1976).
34. 17 U.S.C. §110 (1976).
35. 17 U.S.C. §113(c) (1976).
36. 17 U.S.C. §118(d)(3) (1976).
37. 17 U.S.C. §109(b) (1976).
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to cure any procedural defects are not taken.3'
Publication is "the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending."40 As to unique works of fine art, an implication may be
drawn that since "copies" are the material objects of fixation, then
publication is the public sale or transfer of that unique work of art.
This implication has not been acknowledged by the courts; how-
ever, Representative Kastenmeier, a sponsor of the Copyright Re-
vision Bill, stated during the House debates that publication as to
works of art would exist only where reproductions of the work were
offered or sold to the public or where sale of the one-copy work
was offered or sold by an untraditional method.4' This distinction
between traditional and untraditional means is not based upon ex-
plicit statutory language. An argument can be made that because a
unique work of art is one copy and the plural "copies" was used in
the definition of publication, publication can occur only where the
unique work has been reproduced, to constitute "copies."' If no
publication existed, all one-copy works of art could be displayed
publicly or sold continuously without the need to follow the notice
provisions' in order to preserve the artist's exclusive rights.4
Regardless of the validity of the plurality argument and its
conclusions, a compromise exists. Under the 1976 act, public dis-
plays of the work, despite reproduction restrictions, do not equal
publication." Notice requirements have been liberalized;4 thus
making it more difficult to invalidate an artist's copyright. 7 A
weakness still exists, however, in the case of a private sale (i.e., no
publication) where the purchaser causes publication by publicly
displaying the work of art, allowable under section 109(b). 4* Unless
39. See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
40. 17 US.C. §101 (1976).
41. HR. Res. 1550, 94th Cong., 2nd Sees., 122 CONG. Rc. 31979-80 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
1976).
42. See Weissman, Can An Artist's Copyright Be Jeopardized?.: An Analysis of Cur-
rent Marketing Practices in the Sale of Art Works, 6 ART & LAw 66, (1981); Schilit, A Look
at the Copyright Revision Act Through the Eyes of the Art Collector, 6 ART & LAw 31, 32-
33 (1981); Kunstadt, Can Copyright Law Effectively Promote Progress in the Visual Arts?
25 Corazowrr L. Svw. (ASCAP) 159, 183-85 (1980).
43. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
44. See Weissman, supra, note 42.
45. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976); Houss Rzpoirr, supra note 5, at 144; SRNATe REPORT, supra
note 5, at 126.
46. 37 C.F.R. §201.20 (1983). See infra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
47. To hold otherwise, in cases where no notice was affixed to the work, would make
the artist dependent upon the purchaser to preserve the artist's copyright.
48. 17 U.S.C. §109(b) (1976).
[Vol. 1:99
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the notice requirements of section 401"' were previously met by the
artist, the purchaser would have the power to throw the noticeless
work into the public domain, thus defeating all of the artist's ex-
clusive rights and making those rights (though now nonexclusive)
available for the purchaser. This construction would not take into
account the underlying policy to prevent unnecessary forfeitures.
This author hopes that the courts will soon require the owner of
the work of art to place proper notice on the work upon its
publication.
C. Ownership and Transfer
Under section 202, copyright ownership and ownership of the
material object (i.e., copy) are distinct and separate things."
Transfer of ownership in one does not of itself convey nor necessi-
tate conveyance of ownership in the other. 1 Section 204(a)" states
that a transfer of copyright ownership is only valid upon a written,
signed conveyance agreement, 3 which can be recorded in the copy-
right office.' 4 Without an agreement, transfer of copyright does not
convey any property rights in the material object."
Initial copyright ownership vests in the creator of the work of
art. 6 If the work was made for hire, 7 absent an express, written,
signed agreement to the contrary, the employer or one who com-
missioned the work is considered to be the author and thus owner
of the copyright." However, for a commissioned work to be consid-
ered a work made for hire, it must fall within a category enumer-
ated in section 101. In the case of contributions to collective works,
"copyright in each separate contribution. . . is distinct from copy-
right in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the
author of the contribution. '" 9 Copyright belonging to an individual
author cannot be taken away by involuntary transfer.'0 Without an
express transfer of copyright or any exclusive rights, the copyright
owner of the collective work owns only reproduction and distribu-
49. 17 U.S.C. §401 (1976).
50. 17 U.S.C. §202 (1976).
51. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 124; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 107-08.
52. Id.
53. 17 U.S.C. §204(a) (1976).
54. Id. §205(a).
55. 17 U.S.C. §202 (1976).
56. Id. §201.






Strom: Fine Art: Protection of Artist and Art
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
106 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
tion rights in the individual contributions as part of the collective
work."
Termination of transfers of copyright or any of its rights after
January 1, 1978 is subject to termination at any time during the
period of 30 to 35 years from the date of execution of the grant."'
Various provisions for death of the author,63 joint works,64 notice"
and effect" provide further requirements.
D. Notice andeDeposit
Copyright is required to be on "all publicly distributed copies"
whenever the copyright protected work of art is published by au-
thority of the copyright owner."7 The notice, which must include
"©," "Copyright" or "Copyr.," the year of first publication and the
copyright owner's name,68 should be placed so as to "give reasona-
ble notice" of the copyright claim. " For all two-dimensional picto-
rial, graphic and sculptural works, the notice may be durably af-
fixed to the front or back of the actual copies or "to any backing,
mounting, matting, framing or other material to which the copies
are durably attached or in which they are permanently housed.' 70
For all three-dimensional works of art, notice may be attached to
any visible part of the work, even a permanent base.7 1 Other forms
may be acceptable if notice is visible and permanent.
72
Many artists are unaware of these liberalized notice require-
ments. 73 Even many artists who are familiar with the requirements
intentionally omit any notice because they fear it may deface the
work, '74 make purchasers less willing to buy due to the artist's re-









69. Id. §401(c). These notice requirements also satisfy the notice requirements of the
Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868 (revised)
(twenty-six parties are signatories, including the United States).
70. 37 C.F.R. §201.20(i)(1).
71. 37 C.F.R. §201.20(i)(2).
72. 37 C.F.R. §201.20(i)(3)(4)(5).
73. Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright?: An Empirical and
Legal Survey, 24 COPYRIGHT LAW Symp. (ASCAP) 157, 161-62 (1980).
74. Id. at 171-73.
75. Id. at 159.
[Vol. 1:99
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ance."6 Omission of notice, intentional or inadvertent, will not au-
tomatically invalidate the copyright if: 1) no more than "a
relatively small number of copies" publicly distributed are missing
the notice; or 2) the artist registers the work within five years after
publication without notice and makes a reasonable effort to add
notice to publicly distributed copies upon discovery of the omis-
sion.77 Failure to use these curative provisions will thrust the work
of art into the public domain.
Even with the liberalization of notice requirements, notice ar-
guably is unnecessary on fine art since copyright exists from the
time of creation and fixation. 8 The mere physical embodiment of
the creation would then be adequate notice of copyright protec-
tion. Also, the date of publication of artistic works created after
January 1, 1978, is now irrelevant since copyright duration for such
works is the author's life plus fifty years with no renewal provi-
sions.79 Simply requiring the artist's name would give sufficient in-
formation to a purchaser so as to determine the expiration of the
copyright.80
Due to generous deposit requirements, the Copyright Office
will accept one copy of identifying material s' for any published or
unpublished pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. For published
pictorial, graphic or sculptural works to fall within this deposit ex-
ception, the individual artist must be the copyright owner and ei-
ther: (a) not more than five published copies exist; or (b) not more
than 300 numbered copies of a published limited edition have been
offered for sale or sold.82 Specific relief from deposit in unusual
cases may be granted by the Register upon request.8"
76. Id. at 158.
77. 17 U.S.C. §405 (1976).
78. See Millinger, supra note 12, at 374.
79. 17 U.S.C. §302(a) (1976). The life of the author plus fifty years provision is appli-
cable to works created on or after January 1, 1978.
80. See Millinger, supra note 12, at 374-75; 17 U.S.C. §409(2) (1976); 17 U.S.C. §706
(1976); 37 C.F.R. §203.4. The Copyright Office keeps records, including the date of the origi-
nal copyright owner's death.
81. "[T]he material shall consist of photographic prints, transparencies, photostats,
drawings, or similar two-dimensional reproductions or rendering of the work, in a form visu-
ally perceivable without the aid of a machine or device. In the case of pictorial or graphic
works, such material shall reproduce the actual colors employed in the work." 37 C.F.R.
§201.21(a) (reserved).
82. 37 C.F.R. §202.20(c)(2)(iv).
83. 37 C.F.R. §202.19(e).
19841
9
Strom: Fine Art: Protection of Artist and Art
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
108 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
E. Manufacturing Clause
The manufacturing clause, section 601,8 requiring United
States authored works and other specified works to be produced in
United States or Canada, generally does not apply to the visual
arts. The requirements do, however, apply to works: 1) consisting
of pictorial and graphic works incorporated into predominantly
nondramatic literary work in English; 2) where the owner of the
copyright in the nondramatic literary material also owns the copy-
right of the pictorial or graphic works; and 3) where the work is
not otherwise exempt from the manufacturing clause." Thus,
where lithographs of a work of art by a United States national are
incorporated in a book or periodical of predominantly nondramatic
literary materials, and, where the artist owned the copyright in the
text, the text but not the lithographs, would be subject to the re-
strictions of the manufacturing clause. 6
III. DROIT DE SUITE
Artists do not automatically receive royalties or income after
the initial sale of an original work of art for use in commercial ven-
tures or in exhibitions. Authors, composers and performing artists
continually benefit economically through exploitation of their re-
production right; yet an artist's original, the product of his creativ-
ity, is of more value to him or her than any reproduction." Upon
the artist's initial sale of his one-copy work, his right of reproduc-
tion, though existing theoretically, is effectively destroyed since ac-
cess is restricted unless explicit contractual provisions for future
access are obeyed. Most fine artists create their works of art with
no intent to mass produce them, and in fact, shun all intimations
that a work is commercial or a subject of mass production."
The first droit de suite legislation was enacted in France, in
1920, after the public was educated to the existence of poor, starv-
ing artists whose works were being resold for enormous sums of
money." The French legislature, in an attempt to redress the
84. 17 u.s.c. §601 (1976).
85. Id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 166-67, SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 149.
86. Id.
87. 2 M. NiMuMaa NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §8:22(A) (1983) (hereinafter cited as 2 M.
NnsmER). "Reproductions of works of art have not in the past, and probably still do not to
any great extent, represent a meaningful source of income for most artists." Id.
88. See Sheehan, supra note 7, at 171-73.
89. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite; The Problem of Protection for the Underpriv-
ileged Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SyMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1962).
[Vol. 1:99
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problem, granted an inalienable three percent (3%) resale royalty
to the artists and their heirs for the artist's life plus fifty (50) years
on original graphic or plastic art works resold for over one hundred
new francs.90 Theoretically, all resales are covered, however, in
practice, private sales are exempted.'1 Royalties are paid by the
seller of the art work, regardless of any depreciation in value, to a
professional organization named Societe de la Propriete Artistique
Des Dessins et Modeles (S.P.A.D.E.M.). S.P.A.D.E.M. in turn pays
the percentage to the artists.9"
The French droit de suite has been a mixed success. Because
the legislation builds on a premise of commercial success, the rela-
tively prosperous artists and their heirs benefit the most while the
lesser known, struggling artists remain exploited."s
In 1965, a similar droit de suite was enacted in West Germany
providing that a resale through an art dealer or an auctioneer com-
mands from the seller a royalty of 5% of the resale price if over
one hundred marks, even if a loss is realized. The alienable royalty
entitlement applies to all resales during the artist's life plus sev-
enty (70) years."
Italy's droit de suite statute, unlike its French and German
counterparts, attempts to correlate payment with an increasing
value of the work. Royalties are only computed as to the seller's
realized increase above the previous sale price. Payment by the
seller is based upon a sliding percentage scale tied to factors in-
cluding appreciation of sales price, public versus private sale and
initial public sale." Another facet of Italian law is that royalty
rates apply to private as well as public sales."
Under the Universal Copyright Convention, any artist of a
party country living in France, as well as any other party country
granting royalty rights to artists, may receive any royalty conferred
by that country, even though the artist's origin country has no re-
ciprocal royalty law.9
90. R. DuFry, ART LAw: REPRESENTING ARTISTS, DEALERS AND COLLECToRS 266 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as R. DUpPY).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id. at 269.
94. Id. at 270.
95. See Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976; The Case of
Droit de Suite, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 200, 203 (1978).
96. Id. at 203. Where an exhibition is not involved, increased minimum resale prices, a
different percentage royalty and a price floor of five times the original sale price all apply.
Id.
97. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868,
19841
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The United States has no comprehensive federal resale royalty
legislation for artists." However, droit de suite was successfully in-
troduced on the state level in the form of the California Resale
Royalties Act." No other state droit de suite legislation has been
successfully passed."
A. Legislation as a Possible Remedy
The California legislation applies to the sale of work of "fine
art,"' 00 regardless of its date of creation, where either the seller is a
California resident or the sale occurs in California.101 The seller
pays the artist a royalty of 5% of the sales price of $1,000 or
greater, as long as the increase is attained in the resale price above
the original price.'01 Although the resale right ends at the artist's
death,10 3 during the artist's life the right to royalties can only be
waived by a written contract giving the artist more than the 5%
statutory royalty rate.'"
The seller pays the royalty fee directly to the artist and if the
artist cannot be found the seller must pay the 5% royalty to the
California Arts Council or be subject to a possible damage suit by
the artist."0 If the Arts Council is unable to locate the artist and, if
seven (7) years after the sale of the work the artist fails to file a
written claim for the money, then right of the artist terminates
and the money is used to fund programs of the Arts Council.'"
In 1980, the constitutionality of the California Resale Royal-
ties Act was upheld in Morseburg v. Balyon.'0 However, because
the art work involved in Morseburg was resold in 1977 and the
Art. 11 (1). However, the artist must comply with copyright formalities requirements of the
Convention as well as any other formalities the legislation requires. Id.
98. A bill providing for a federal royalty right to artists was introduced by Represen-
tative Henry Waxman (D. Ca.) in 1978. Visual Arts Bill of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong.,
2nd Sass., 125 CoNo. Rzc. 6176-78 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1978). This bill seems to have been
shelved.
99. California Resale Royalties Act, CAL. CiV. CODE §986 (West 1980) (amended
1982).
99a. However, legislation has been proposed in nine other states (Georgia, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee And Texas).
100. "Fine Art" means an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work
of art in glass." CAL. CIV. CODE §986(c)(2) (West 1980).
101. Id. §986(a).





107. 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
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1976 Copyright Act became effective January 1, 1978,' the chal-
lenge fell under the previous 1909 Copyright Act.'"' No decision
has yet been made under the present Copyright Act as to the va-
lidity of the California Act.
A major concern as to the validity of the California Act under
the 1976 Copyright Act is preemption. The preemption test of sec-
tion 301(a) is two-fold. The State law is preempted if: 1) it pro-
vides "equivalent rights""'  to the exclusive rights enumerated in
section 106 and 2) those rights apply to works which are "fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter
of copyright.""' Works of "fine art" under the California Act are
also within the "pictorial graphic and sculptural works""' 2 category
of copyrightable material." 3 "Fine arts" in California then are
copyrightable and satisfy the second part of the section 301 test.
The preemption question turns on the meaning and application of
the term "equivalent rights."'" 4  Past interpretation of the
"equivalent rights" analysis'" have produced approaches which
sometimes work individually but fail to result in consistent conclu-
sions." 6 This analysis should not be used if Congress did not in-
tend preemption of state laws, such as in California, which merely
extend rights equal to and not conflicting with federal rights."7 In-
stead, a traditional preemption approach" 8 may be more appropri-
ate for such analysis and would consider the purposes of the Copy-
right Act. The courts have derived these purposes to be the
provision incentive for authors to devote themselves to intellectual
108. 17 U.S.C. §301 (1976).
109. 17 U.S.C. §§1-63 (1909).
110. 17 U.S.C. §301(a) (1976).
111. 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976). "'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs,
prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical drawings, diagrams, and
models."
112. Id. §102(a)(5).
113. Clarke, The California Resale Royalties Act as a Test Case for Preemption
Under the 1976 Copyright Law, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1315, 1322 (1981).
114. 17 U.S.C. §301(a) (1976).
115. Approaches to an "equivalent rights" analysis include: the extra-element ap-
proach, Id. at 1322; the economic-noneconomic distinction, Id. at 1324; the use of a broad
definition of 'equivalent rights,' Id. at 1324; the absence of differences between the state and
federal laws, Id. at 1324-25.
116. Id. at 1325.
117. Id.
118. The traditional preemption analysis asks: 1) Has Congress occupied the field in
question expressly or impliedly? and, 2) Does the state statute conflict with a federal statute
so as to impair Congress' purpose of enactment? Id. at 1320-21.
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and artistic creation"' and the circulation of ideas through the
public domain.1 20 Support exists for both sides of the preemption
question as applied to the California Resale Royalties Act.12'
Aside from the preemption question, the California Act
presents other problems. The act fails to benefit many artists since
only the few most successful artists have a significant resale mar-
ket during their lifetime. 22 Struggling artists whose works have
low resale demand benefit minimally. Also, without an adequate
inflation formula the profit realized upon resale may only reflect
inflation and not a true increase in the value of the art work.'
23
Royalty enforcement is virtually impossible because the average
transactions involve only small sums and many transactions go
unreported."
The California Resale Royalties Act does not appear to be the
answer to an artist's dreams. Federal legislation would eliminate
the preemption problem but drafters would need to correct the
flaws shown in the California Act, including practical distribution
procedures."'
B. Other Remedies
Artists also turn to contracts as a method of reserving resale
royalties rights. The famous "Projansky Agreement""O attempts to
control future resales by providing that each buyer obtain written
agreement to the terms of the original contract from each subse-
quent transferee.1 7 However, the use of this agreement has both
119. Mazer v. Stein, supra note 18, at 219; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
120. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
121. For authors who support preemption, see 2 M. Niumi 8:272.4(2)-8:272.8; Katz,
supra note 95, at 219-22. For Authors concluding that the California Act should not be
preempted see Clarke, supra note 113, at 1332; Comment, The Resale Royalties Act: Paint-
ings, Preemption Profit, 8 GoLwar GATs L. Rav. 239 (1978).
122. Camp, Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An Empirical Study, 28
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 146, 147 (1980); R. Duwy, supra note 90, at 277.
123. R. DuFrv, supra note 90, at 279.
124. Id. at 280; Katz, supra note 95, at 220-21. Other questions arise: Should works of
art be treated differently from other art considered by most to be crafts? Will the costs of
resale imposed by California Act force some marginal art dealers out of business and pre-
vent remaining dealers from subsidizing the promotion of unknown artists? Will the Act put
California art dealers at a disadvantage with dealers in other states?
125. For example, a federal regulatory body could be created to perform similar func-
tions to those of ASCAP, BMI, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal which regulate royalties
for literary and musical authors.
126. The Projansky Agreement was created in 1971 by an attorney, Robert Projansky.
127. R. DunY, supra note 90, at 283-84.
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legal and practical weaknesses. Legally, the' provisions attempting
to bind future buyers into paying royalties may violate the rule
against perpetuities. Also, enforcement may prove to be problem-
atic since no privity exists between the artist and subsequent
transferees.'28 As a practical matter, most artists do not have the
necessary bargaining power to require galleries or collectors to sign
such agreements. Most galleries and dealers reject any type of roy-
alty agreement because they believe that it: affects sales, ' 9 "in-
vades the intrinsically trusting nature of the art world"'13  and
turns the artist-dealer relationship into an adversarial one."3' Also,
the artist must somehow overcome the considerable burden of
checking on adherence to the agreement by future buyers.3 2 Per-
haps the answer to assisting struggling professional artists is legis-
lation designed to subsidize them. A federal sales tax on all works
of art could be levied, collected and placed into a reserve to be
allocated to artists, according to their needs. 1
3
IV. DRorr MORAL
Copyright is a property interest, protecting the economic, ex-
ploitive interests of the artist. In contrast, moral rights, or droit
moral, is a bundle of rights which protect an artist's personality
and artistic reputation.'34 An artist's moral rights can be classified
into three categories: 1) the right of publication which includes
rights to create, to publish, not to publish and to withdraw from
publication; 2) the right of paternity, which includes the rights to
be recognized as creator of a work, to prevent misattribution, to
use a pseudonym and to protect anonymity; and 3) the right of
integrity which is the right to control modifications of the work by
objecting to mutilation or distortion of a work.'33 Whereas copy-
right may be transferred by the artist to another, moral rights are
inalienable with the artist retaining their exclusive ownership,
above and beyond ownership in copyright or in the material
128. Id. at 284.
129. Id. at 289.
130. Pick, Artists Need Lawyers, Too, 10 STUDENT LAW. 16, 20 (Sept. 1981).
131. Id.
132. R. DupTY, supra note 90, at 289.
133. Id. at 282.
134. "It has been pointed out that the theoretical dichotomy between pecuniary and
moral rights is artificial, since many if not all of the author's moral rights can also have a
pecuniary impact." Diamond, Legal Protection for "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other
Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 244, 249 (1978).
135. For a more detailed discussion, see Diamond, supra note 134, at 252-59; and R.
Duury, supra note 90, at 290-93.
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object.' s3
The doctrine of moral rights first emerged in the French
courts and was there developed until its formal statutory recogni-
tion in 1957.13 The French statute is based upon the protection of
personality and artistic reputation of the artist through respect for
the work of art; it does not focus upon the work of art itself.'
French moral rights may not be waived and they are perpetual and
inalienable.
Moral rights are addressed in the statutes of many other coun-
tries but not in the laws of the United States. The Berne Interna-
tional Copyright Convention'8 9 affords moral rights to non-mem-
bers as well as its members. Any artist of the United States, a non-
member, is entitled to legal protection if the author first publishes
a work in a Berne Convention country.4 0
The United States cannot be a member of the Berne Conven-
tion because its domestic laws fail to meet the minimum require-
ments for copyright protection of a work absent formalities"" and
for protection of moral rights.'" Representative Barney Frank has
introduced into the United States House of Representatives the
"Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment of 1983,"' s' modelled
closely after the Berne Convention. To the present time, however,
similar attempts have always failed."'
In the United States an artist has economic and property pro-
tection through copyright law or by contract. However, most courts
refuse to accept, or even acknowledge, protection of moral rights of
136. Crawford, Moral Rights and the Artist, 42 AM. ARTIST 98 (Apr. 1978).
137. Diamond, supra note 134, at 245.
138. Moral rights of artists have been statutorily recognized in 63 nations; they are
included in international conventions on literary property. UNESCO, Copyright Laws and
Treaties of the World. France, "Law of March", 1957, article 6 states: "the author shall
enjoy the right of respect for his name, his authorship and his work, this right shall be
attached to his person."
139. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (Paris
Act), July 24, 1971, Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, vol. 3, item H-1, (Supp.
1972) (hereinafter cited as Berne Convention).
140.. R. DuvFY, supra note 90, at 294 (citing Berne Convention, supra note 139, article
5).
141. Berne Convention, supra note 139, article 5(2).
142. Id. article 6 bis.
143. H.R. 1521, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. Rac. H578-79 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
1983).
144. Congressman Barney Frank introduced the same bill in 1981, H.R. 2908, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 1217 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1981). Representative Robert
Drinan introduced the same bill in 1979, H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) and in 1977,
H.R. 8261, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). All bills were assigned to the House Committee on
the Judiciary. No further action has been taken.
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a work of art.'" Moral rights, if recognized at all, are viewed as
elements of analogous, traditional rights. Such traditional legal
theories are breach of contract, copyright infringement, libel, defa-
mation, invasion of privacy, unfair competition and misappropria-
tion. In certain instances where artists have attempted to preserve
their moral rights under these "more conventional and respectable
labels,"14' 6 such rights are indirectly upheld without even using the
term "moral rights. '1 47 These instances have yet to become reliable
answers to the moral rights problem.
A. The Rights in Particular
Right of first publication is granted both under the 1976 Cop-
yright Act 1M and under a moral rights doctrine. A correlative right
of first publication, the right to withhold a work from publication,
is necessarily implied.14 9 Yet another aspect of publication rights,
withdrawal from publication, overlaps with the right of integrity,
since an artist may wish to withdraw a work feeling that the work
no longer represents his or her personality or ability.150 Typical av-
enues for seeking legal protection for right of publication and the
rights contained in it include right to privacy, copyright, libel and
unfair competition" 1 as well as breach of contract. 6'
The moral right of paternity goes to the very heart of an art-
ist's interest. In the United States the paternal right to receive
credit for a work is not recognized absent express contractual res-
ervation,15 3 and is not protected under the Copyright Act. Further,
under section 201(b), in a work made for hire, authorship is not
granted to the artist but to the employer. 54 The artist's right to
prevent attribution of another's name to his or her work, is pre-
145. The courts in Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, (7th Cir. 1947) and in Crimi
v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949), rejected the
moral rights doctrine as alien to common law tradition.
146. Diamond, supra note 134, at 252.
147. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Granz v.
Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring); Chesler v. Avon Book Div.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 76 Misc.2d 1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973) (quoting Clemens v.
Press Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (App. Term 1910) (Seabury, J., concurring)).
148. 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
149. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 205 n.1 (1890).
150. However, this right may interfere with the rights of a third party. See Diamond,
supra note 134, at 253-54.
151. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1973).
152. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
153. See Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); 2 M. NIMMER at §8:267 (1982).
154. 17 U.S.C. §201(b) (1976).
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served by the 1976 Copyright Act only to the extent that any ex-
clusive right (i.e., reproduction, derivative works, publication, dis-
play) is violated.' 65 Upon transfer of the artist's copyright to
another, the artist's paternal rights are unprotected, and remedies
must be sought under the label of unfair competition'" or libel.
Misattribution has also become actionable in some cases using sec-
tions 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act,1 57 a source of unfair com-
petition. Likewise, attribution of an artist's name to another art-
ist's work will mandate the use of unfair competition, libel or right
to privacy theories. Similarly, an artist's use of a pseudonym on his
or her work, although not a recognized right, has occasionally been




The right of integrity is the protection against deformation,
mutilation and other modifications of artistic works resulting in
prejudice towards the artist's reputation or honor. This right is es-
pecially vital to the artist creating original, one-of-kind works, for
harm to that single copy effectively destroys the work as well as
the artist's personality. Until recently, this right has received little
support in the visual arts area.1 5'
If the plaintiff did not contract away the right to object to
mutilation or deformation of the work, relief may be found by the
court through contractual interpretation. Unfortunately, an artist
may not always have privity of contract with the person disfiguring
the work of art, thus weakening the viability of remedy under con-
tract law. Depending upon the circumstances, theories of defama-
tion and equity are possible vehicles of relief to the artist. Also, a
number of mutilation cases have been determined upon unfair
competition'"e using section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The prevention of total destruction of the work is not a right
of an artist in the United States absent contractual provisions or
155. 17 U.S.C. 1106 (1976).
156. Granz v. Harris, supra note 153, at 589.
157. The Lanham Act, 115 U.S.C. §1126(i), §§(43)(a) and (44)(i) (1982).
158. Diamond, supra note 134, at 264-67.
159. P. Duy, supra note 90, at 304; Diamond, supra note 134, at 255-56. See also
Jenson, The Selling of Picasso: A Look at the Artist's Rights In Protecting the Reputation
of His Name, 6 ART & LAw 77 (1981), describing the theories on which the Visual Artists
and Galleries Association was able to obtain a preliminary injunction to prevent street ven-
dors from selling t-shirts with a facsimile of Pablo Picasso's signature.
160. See Meliodon v. School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938).
Analogous cases involving motion pictures may lend some help to the establishment of this
right. See generally, Gilliam, supra note 147; Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148
U.S.P.Q. 755 (Cal. Sup. Ct. L.A. County 1966); Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. 6 Misc.2d
383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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retention of copyright by the artist.'' Apparently, the interests of
the owner of the material work of art prevail over the moral rights
of the artist, perhaps due to the argument that the artist's reputa-
tion or honor is not damaged when the work is made
unavailable. 162
B. Alternative Legal Theories
In general, most aspects of moral rights, though not explicitly
recognized, may be enforced through analogous, accepted theories
of law. These avenues to remedy, however, do not necessarily pro-
vide strong alternatives in every fact situation.
In a breach of contract action, no relief is available without
privity of contract; thus, any resale makes this relief ineffective.' 3
Also, most artists do not have the bargaining power necessary to
insist upon inclusion of moral rights provisions in their contracts.
In an "appropriate" case, the court may somehow imply a term to
the contract in order to protect a moral right; 1  in other cases a
court, in strictly construing a contract, will refuse to enforce any
moral claim.1 "6
The use of copyright infringement actions to enforce moral
rights are limited for the visual artist. Many artists do not perfect
their copyright;1" other artists lose any potential protection upon
transfer of their copyright ownership.'"
Libel actions are deficient since only those renowned artists
who have established a reputation may bring an action for its in-
jury. Such an artist would most likely be considered a "public
figure" plaintiff and must bear a stringent burden of proof for mal-
ice under New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny.1" A cause
of action for libel may only produce damages. 16" Injunctions to stop
161. See Granz, supra note 153, at 589.
162. R. DumY, supra note 90, at 310.
163. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, supra note 145.
164. Diamond, supra note 134, at 261.
165. Id. at 263 (citing Granz, supra note 153, at 588).
166. See generally Vargas, supra note 145.
167. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
168. By transfering ownership of all exclusive rights, the artist loses all copyright pro-
tection. 17 U.S.C. §201(d)(2) (1976). The artist may terminate the transfer at any time dur-
ing five years at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the transfer. 17
U.S.C. §203(a)(3) (1976).
169. The artist would have to prove that the "libel" (i.e. "damage" to the artist's work
and thus his/her reputation) was published with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reck-
less disregard of whether or not it was false. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra note 152; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403
U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
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the defamatory publication may not be issued."' In addition, libel
does not survive the artist's death. An unfair competition cause of
action also is dependent upon the fame of the artist, as the theory
maintains that the name indicates to the public a particular source
of creation. Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act have been
invoked as a source of unfair competition to protect artists' rights.
Through a gradual trend courts are broadly reading those sections,
extending protection to more rights for artists.M  Absent moral
rights legislation, unfair competition under the Lanham Act has
become an increasingly viable alternative.
C. Droit Moral Legislation
Attempts have been made to legislate moral rights in the
United States. On the federal level, Congressman Frank's bill,
"Visual Artists Moral Rights Amendment, '17' gives the artist'
73
the right "to claim authorship" (right of paternity) and the right
"to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other alteration thereof,
and to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Copyright Of-
fice that would prevent prejudice to the author's honor or reputa-
tion," (right of integrity).
17 '
Only one successful state attempt, the California Art Preserva-
tion Act (hereinafter California Act),' 78 has afforded fine artists
any moral rights. The California Act defines "fine art" as "an origi-
nal painting, sculpture, or drawing of recognized quality," not in-
cluding work under contract for commercial use. 17 The quality of
the work is the focal point, not the rights of the artist.1 7 This em-
U.S. 448 (1976).
170. Diamond, supra note 134, at 264.
171. Id.
172. Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act - A Judi-
cial Shell Game? 48 Gao. WAsH. L. Rzv. 377, 387 (1980).
173. Supra at note 143. The test is as follows:
(d) Independently of the author's copyright in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural
work, the author or author's legal representative shall have the right during
the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death, to claim au-
thorship of such work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
alteration thereof, and to enforce any other limitation recorded in the Cop-
yright Office that would prevent prejudice to the author's honor or
reputation.
174. Also, the artist's legal representative. Id.
175. California Art Preservation Act, CA. Civ. CoDE §987 (1979).
176. See Hoffman, The California Art Preservation Act, 5 AR & LAw 5354 (1980);
Gantz, Protecting Artist's Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art Preservation Act
as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 873, 883 (1981).
177. Hoffman. supra note 176, at 54.
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phasis on the "quality" of artistic works is in recognition of a socie-
tal interest in preserving the integrity of cultural products. Grant-
ing an artist moral rights is an indirect way of protecting the
artistic work as well as society's interest in it.
78
The California Act confers upon artists the rights of integ-
rity 9 and paternity.1 80 In section 987(c), the right of integrity is
defined as the right to prevent the "intentional" commission of
"physical" defacement, mutilation, alteration or destruction,"'
thus limiting the scope of the right granted. A claim of First
Amendment protection for acts of mutilation or physical distortion
would fall to the California Act's protection of the art under the
United States v. O'Brien test.""' Looking to the values underlying
the First Amendment, its interest is considerably less than the le-
gitimate and substantial governmental interest in protecting cul-
tural objects for the public as well as protecting the artist's person-
ality embodied in such works of art."" Protection lies only to abuse
of the original work, thereby avoiding disputes originating where a
work is altered only as to a new artistic medium.'" The California
Act's rights to paternity explicitly allows an artist to either claim
or disclaim authorship. 185 On the other hand, in the absence of a
contract stating otherwise, an artist may not object to a truthful
statement that such artist did create the work.
Preemption is at issue with the California Art Preservation
Act, as it was with the California Resale Royalties Act."e The same
arguments may be made for both statutes. Additionally, because
moral rights protect an artist's personal interests and do not go to
the purely economic interests afforded by copyright, the equivalent
rights test would not allow preemption."
8
7
In light of judicial reluctance to accept moral rights per se,
legislation is an important vehicle for their preservation. Efforts to
178. Id.
179. CAL. Civ. CODE §987(c) (1979).
180. Id. §987(d).
181. Id. §987(c).
182. Hoffman, supra, note 176, at 56, citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 366
(1968). The test is: "[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified ... [1] if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; [2] if the governmental interest is unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression; and [3] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."
183. Hoffman, supra note 176, at 56.
184. Id. at 54.
185. Supra note 180.
186. See supra notes 110-120 and accompanying text.
187. Hoffman, supra note 176, at 56.
19841
21
Strom: Fine Art: Protection of Artist and Art
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
procreate moral rights from existing, accepted legal theories have
instead produced inconsistent and muddled decisions. A more co-
herent, understandable set of standards in the form of moral rights
legislation is thus highly desirable.
V. MAJOR OBSTACLES TO ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF FINE ART
To gain optimal effectiveness of rights already furnished, art-
ists must first strive for maximum exploitation of the 1976 Copy-
right Act. At present, the majority of artists, art dealers and gal-
leries, and art collectors lack sufficient knowledge of the copyright
law for such use.'"' Since lack of knowledge is the problem, educa-
tion is the answer. Reliable information must be readily accessible
to artists and others involved.
To begin with, more art educational programs should give in-
struction in copyright protection as a requisite part of their curric-
ulum. Workshops and seminars may be establ:shed in continuing
education departments for those artists already out of school or for
those who never attended school.18' Knowledgeable instructors are
indispensible to this approach.1 " Perhaps a team-teaching system
consisting of an attorney, knowledgeable of the Copyright Act,1"
and an art instructor, familiar with the practical concerns of art-
ists, would fill this need.
As informational sources, art gallery operators and art organi-
zations should educate themselves so as to give artists basic but
necessary information on copyright protection." 2 Because strug-
gling artists rarely can turn to attorneys for copyright advice,"e' art
gallery directors and art organizations are frequently their primary
source of information. Galleries, art organizations and widely dis-
tributed art periodicals should assume some responsibility for dis-
seminating complete and accurate copyright information.
Some fine artists renounce copyright protection, because, in
their opinion, notice defaces a work of art" and disturbs the in-
tegrity of the work. Similarly, they fear that notice gives a com-
188. See Sheehan, supra note 73, at 161-71.
189. Most university art departments offer no courses covering copyright. See Id. at
163-64.
190. Id. at 164.
191. A possible pool of attorneys would be those belonging to volunteer lawyers for the
arts organizations.
192. Sheehan, supra note 73, at 166-67.
193. This is probably due to the high cost of legal advice. Id. at 168.
194. Id. at 171-72.
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mercial, mass-produced appearance.19' To the fine artist whose
works are valued for their uniqueness and originality, this fear may
be overpowering. Furthermore, artists believe that the commercial
aura will make art dealers less willing to handle the art work and
collectors less willing to buy them, which may in fact be true.'
These apprehensions originate in the traditional notion of integ-
rity, and, more importantly, out of ignorance of the relaxed notice
requirements.1 97 Again, education will help to disperse the artist's
anxieties of transgressing the integrity of a work.
Another aspect of economic protection of fine arts is resale
royalty rights. At present, such rights exist only in California'"
and the California Resale Royalties Act has enough weaknesses to
render its usefulness at least doubtful.'" A workable royalty
scheme has yet to be found.
An artist's moral interests in his or her creations have been
virtually neglected in the United States. Absent explicit legislation,
the moral rights decisions grounded upon accepted legal theories,
have been inconsistent and confusing. In an educated society
which enjoys and exploits the creative efforts of its nationals, the
least that can be done is to protect the moral rights of artists with-
out whom these works would not exist. Moral rights exist tradi-
tionally in the majority of educated societies, and most certainly
exist in the hearts and minds of the artists themselves. Without
explicit federal legislation, artists may never totally attain these
rights which, to many artists, are more dear than economic success.
Cordia A. Strom
195. Id. at 173-74.
196. Id. at 158-59.
197. See supra notes 70 and 72.
198. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 110-124 and accompanying text.
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